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ABSTRACT
We formulate the interaction between the communicating
nodes and an adversary within a game-theoretic context.
We show that earlier information-theoretic capacity results
for a jammed channel correspond to a pure Nash Equilib-
rium (NE). However, when both players are allowed to ran-
domize their actions (i.e., coding rate and jamming power)
new mixed Nash equilibria appear with surprising proper-
ties. We show the existence of a threshold (JTH) such that
if the jammer average power exceeds JTH , the channel ca-
pacity at the NE is the same as if the jammer was using
its maximum allowable power, JMax, all the time. This
indicates that randomization significantly advantages pow-
erful jammers. We also show how the NE strategies can be
derived, and we provide very simple (e.g., semi-uniform) ap-
proximations to the optimal communication and jamming
strategies. Such strategies are very simple to implement in
current hardware and software.
Keywords
Jamming, rate adaptation, capacity, game-theory.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decades, wireless communication proved to
be an enabling technology to an increasingly large number
of applications. The convenience of wireless and its sup-
port of mobility has revolutionized the way we access data,
information services, and interact with the physical world.
Beyond enabling mobile devices to access information and
data services ubiquitously, wireless technology is widely used
∗Research partially supported by NSF Award CNS-0915985.
in cyber-physical systems such as air-traffic control, power
plants synchronization, transportation systems, and human
body implantable devices. This pervasiveness elevated wire-
less communication systems to the level of critical infras-
tructure. Radio-Frequency wireless communications occur
over a broadcast medium, that is not only shared between
the communicating nodes but is also exposed to adversaries.
Jamming is one of the most prominent security threats as it
not only can lead to denial of service attacks, but can also
be the prelude to spoofing attacks.
Anti - jamming has been an active area of research for
decades. Various techniques for combating jamming have
been developed at the physical layer [35] which include di-
rectional antennas, spread spectrum communication, power
/ modulation / coding control. At the time, most of the
wireless communication were not packetized nor networked.
Reliable communication in the presence of adversaries re-
gained significant interest in the last few years, as new jam-
ming attacks and the need for more complex applications
and deployment environments have emerged. Several specif-
ically crafted attacks and counter-attacks were proposed for
packetized wireless data networks [27, 22, 21, 43], multiple
access resolution [5, 13, 4, 2], multi-hop networks [45, 40, 21],
broadcast and control communication [18, 10, 9, 39, 20, 25,
24], cross-layer resiliency [23], wireless sensor networks [46,
47, 48], spread-spectrum without shared secrets [38, 36, 37,
15], and navigation information broadcast systems [34].
Nevertheless, very little work has been done on protecting
rate adaptation algorithms against adversarial attacks. Rate
adaptation plays an important role in widely used wireless
communication systems such as IEEE802.11 standard as the
link quality in a WLAN is often highly dynamic. In recent
years, a number of algorithms for rate adaptation have been
proposed in literature [14, 16, 41, 32, 33, 8, 17, 44], and some
are widely deployed [6, 19]. Recently, rate adaptation for the
widely used IEEE 802.11 protocol was investigated in [30, 7,
28]. Experimental and theoretical analysis of optimal jam-
ming strategies against currently deployed rate adaptation
algorithms indicate that IEEE 802.11 can be significantly
degraded with very few interfering pulses. The commoditi-
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zation of software radios makes these attacks very practical
and calls for investigation of the capacity of packetized com-
munication under adaptive jamming.
In this work, we focus on the problem of determining the
optimal rate control and adaptation mechanisms for a chan-
nel subject to a power constrained jammer. We consider
a setup where a pair of nodes (transmitter and receiver)
communicate using data packets. An adversary (jammer)
can interfere with the communication but is constrained by
an instantaneous maximum power per packet (JMax) and a
long-run average power (JAve). Appropriately coded pack-
ets can overcome interference and are lost otherwise. Over-
coding (coding at low rates) reduces the throughput, while
under-coding (coding at high rates) increases the chances
of loosing a packet. An important question is to under-
stand the interaction between the communicating nodes and
the adversary, determine the long-term achievable maximum
throughput and the optimal strategy to achieve it, as well as
the optimal strategy for the adversary. While, the capacity
of a channel under a fixed-power jammer, and the optimal
strategies for communication and jamming, derive from fun-
damental information theoretic results (See Section 5), these
questions are still open for a packetized communication sys-
tem.
Our contribution can be summarized as follows:
• We formulate the interaction between the communi-
cating nodes and an adversary within a game-theoretic
context. We show the existence of the Nash Equilib-
rium for this non-typical game. We also show that the
Nash Equilibrium strategies can be computed using
Linear Programming.
• We show that earlier information-theoretic capacity re-
sults for a jammed channel correspond to a pure Nash
Equilibrium (NE).
• We further characterize the game by showing that,
when both players are allowed to randomize their ac-
tions (i.e., coding rate and jamming power) new mixed
Nash equilibria appear with surprising properties. We
show the existence of a threshold (JTH) such that if
the jammer average power exceeds JTH , the channel
capacity at the NE is the same as if the jammer was
using JMax all the time.
• We also show that the optimal NE strategies can be
approximated by very simple (e.g., semi-uniform) dis-
tributions. Such strategies are very simple to imple-
ment in current hardware and software.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section
2, we present our model for the communication link, com-
municating nodes and the adversary. In Section 3, we in-
troduce the players, the transmitter and the jammer, and
their respective strategies and payoffs. We discuss how ad-
ditional constraint on jammer’s mixed strategy space makes
our game model different from a typical zero-sum game. In
Section 4, we show that the Nash equilibrium indeed exists.
We also prove the existence of a threshold, JTH , for the jam-
mer and its effect on the game outcome. In Section 5, we
Figure 1: System model
study two particular cases. The case of a powerful jammer,
when jammer’s average power is greater than the thresh-
old, and the case of a weak jammer, when jammer’s average
power is less than the threshold. We will also provide trans-
mitter’s optimal strategies in these two cases. In Section 6,
we study the case where players have infinite number of pure
strategies (the continuous zero-sum game) and finally, we
conclude the paper in Section 7.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section we introduce and define our system model.
The overall system model is shown in Figure 1. The com-
munication link between the transmitter and the receiver is
an AWGN channel with a fixed noise variance. Beside the
channel noise, transmitted packets are being disrupted by
an additive jammer. Jammer’s peak and average power are
assumed to be limited to produce a more realistic model.
2.1 Channel Model
The overall system model is shown in Figure 1. The com-
munication link between the transmitter and the receiver is
assumed to be a single-hop, additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) channel with a fixed and known noise variance, N ,
referred to the receiver’s front end. Furthermore, the com-
munication link is being disrupted by an additive adversary,
the jammer. The jammer transmits radio signals to degrade
the capacity between the transmitter and the receiver. We
assume transmissions are packet-based, i.e., transmissions
take place in disjoint time intervals during which transmit-
ter’s and jammer’s state (parameters) remain unchanged.
We assume packets are long enough that channel capacity
theorem could be applied to each packet being transmitted,
this is justified by today’s Internet protocols that use packet
sizes of up to 1, 500 bytes1.
In section 3 we introduce and study a two-player zero-sum
game in which transmitter-receiver goal is to achieve highest
possible rate while jammer tries to minimize the achievable
rate.
1IEEE 802.3 and IEEE 802.11x protocols allow MAC frame
sizes of up to 1,642 and 2304 bytes respectively.
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Table 1: Table of Notations and Parameters
Parameter Description
PT Transmitter’s power
N Noise power spectral density
JMax Jammer’s maximum power per packet
JAve Jammer’s average power
JTH Jamming power threshold
J Variable denoting jammer’s power
JT Jamming power corresponding to the transmitter’s rate
JT =
[
J0 . . . Jj . . . JNJ
]
1×(NJ+1)
Jamming power vector
Jj =
j
NJ
JMax
RT =
[
R0 . . . Ri . . . RNT
]
1×(NT+1)
Vector corresponding to transmitter’s rates
Ri =
1
2
log
(
1 + PT
N+ i
NT
JMax
)
xT =
[
x0 . . . xi . . . xNT
]
1×(NT+1)
∈ X Transmitter’s mixed-strategy vector
yT =
[
y0 . . . yj . . . yNJ
]
1×(NJ+1)
∈ Y Jammer’s mixed strategy vector
X,Y Mixed-strategy space, transmitter’s and jammer’s respectively
C(NT+1)×(NJ+1) or C(x, y) or C(JAve) Game matrix and expected game payoffs
2.2 Jammer Model
Radio jamming or simply jamming is deliberate transmis-
sion of radio signals with the intention of degrading a com-
munication link. The effect of jammer on the communica-
tion link is reduction of the effective signal to noise ratio
(SNR) at the receiver and hence decreasing the channel ca-
pacity. As long as reduction in effective signal to noise ratio
is concerned, the jammer can use arbitrary random signals
for transmission but, it can be shown [11] that in the AWGN
channel with a fixed and known noise variance, a Gaussian
jammer with a flat power spectral density is the most effec-
tive in minimizing the the capacity between the transmitter
and the receiver. In other words, in the communication game
described above, the optimal strategy for the transmitter is
to use a zero-mean white Gaussian input with variance equal
to P , the transmitter power, and the best strategy for the
jammer is is to use a similar distribution with variance J ,
the jammer power.
A fairly large number of jamming models have been pro-
posed in the literature [31]. The most benign jammer is the
barrage noise jammer. The barrage noise jammer transmits
bandlimited white Gaussian noise with power spectral den-
sity (psd) of J . It is usually assumed that the barrage noise
jammer power spectrum covers exactly the same frequency
range as the communicating system. This kind of jammer
simply increases the Gaussian noise level from N to (N +J)
at the receiver’s front end. Another frequently used jamming
model is the pulse-noise jammer. The pulse noise jammer
transmits pulses of bandlimited white Gaussian noise having
total average power of JAve referred to the receiver’s front
end. It is usually assumed that the jammer chooses the cen-
ter frequency and bandwidth of the noise to be the same as
the transmitter’s center frequency and bandwidth. The jam-
mer chooses its pulse duty factor to cause maximum degra-
dation to the communication link while maintaining the av-
erage jamming power JAve. For a more realistic model, the
pulse-noise jammer could be subject to a maximum peak
power constraint. Other jamming models, to name a few,
are the partial-band jammer and single/multiple-tune jam-
mer.
However, we study a more sophisticated jamming model.
The jammer in study is a reactive and additive jammer,
i.e., he is only active when a packet is being transmitted
and silent otherwise. We assume that the jammer has a
set of discrete jamming power levels uniformly distributed
between J = 0 and J = JMax. The jammer can choose
any jamming power level given that he maintains an overall
average jamming power, JAve. The jammer uses his avail-
able power levels according to a distribution (his strategy),
he chooses an optimal distribution to minimize the achiev-
able capacity of the communication link while maintaining
his maximum and average power constraints, i.e., JMax and
JAve, respectively.
For reasons given in section 2.3, burst jamming (transmit-
ting a burst of white noise to disrupt a few bits in a packet)
is not an optimal jamming scheme. Hence, we assume the
jammer remains active during the entire packet transmis-
sion, i.e., the jammer transmits a continuous Gaussian noise
with a fixed variance J ∈
[
0, JMax
]
for each transmitting
packet.
2.3 Transmitter Model
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Figure 2: Transmitter Model
Transmitter has a rate adaptation block which enables him
to transmit at different rates. Popular techniques to in-
crease or decrease the rate of a code are puncturing or ex-
tending. Puncturing and extending increase the flexibility
of the system without significantly increasing its complex-
ity. Considering jammer’s activity, the transmitter changes
his rate according to a distribution (his strategy). Chang-
ing the rate can be accomplished using techniques like rate-
compatible puncturing. The transmitter chooses an optimal
distribution to achieve the best possible average rate (pay-
off). Same as before, we assume transmissions are packet-
based, i.e., transmissions are taken place in disjoint time in-
tervals during which, transmitter’s rate remain unchanged.
Transmitter’s model is shown in Figure 2.
The interleaver block in transmitter’s model is a counter-
measure to burst errors and burst jamming. Interleaving is
frequently used in digital communications and storage de-
vices to improve the burst error correcting capabilities of a
code. Burst errors are specially troublesome in short length
codes as they have very limited error correcting capabilities.
In such codes, a few number of errors could result in a de-
coding failure or an incorrect decoding. A few incorrectly
decoded codewords within a larger frame could make the
entire frame corrupted.
Fortunately, combining effective interleaving schemes such
as cryptographic interleaving and capacity-achieving codes
such as turbo codes and LDPC codes results in transmission
schemes that have good burst error correcting properties (see
[22]) which make burst jamming ineffective. Therefore, in
our study we do not consider burst jamming and instead
assume that the jammer remains active during the entire
packet transmission.
3. GAME MODEL
In this section we discuss the game setup in detail; we intro-
duce and define the players, their respective strategies and
the constraints in the game. We present the game model
and define and formulate the payoff function in a game theo-
retic frame work. As discussed in section 2.2, in the AWGN
channel, the additive white Gaussian jammer is the opti-
mal jammer, in the sense that the white Gaussian jammer
minimizes the channel capacity. Henceforward, we will only
consider the additive Gaussian jammer.
We present the jammer’s strategy set and introduce the jam-
mer’s average power constraint and its impact on the mixed
strategy space. The additional constraint makes our game
model different from a typical two-player zero-sum game.
We also introduce transmitter’s strategy set and define the
game utility function and the payoff matrix.
We begin by introducing a discrete version of the game to
prove basic concepts and conclusions. Generalization to the
continuous case is given in Section 6
3.1 The Jammer’s Strategy Set
The jammer has the option to select discrete values of jam-
ming power, uniformly distributed over
[
0, JMax
]
. We as-
sume there are (NJ + 1) pure strategies available to the
jammer. Hence, the jammer’s strategy set (set of jamming
powers), J , is given by
J =
{
Jj , 0 ≤ j ≤ NJ
}
(1)
where
Jj =
j
NJ
JMax (2)
We can write the possible jammer power levels in vector
form, hence the jammer’s pure strategies vector, J , is
J
T =
[
J0 . . . Jj . . . JNJ
]
1×(NJ+1)
(3)
where T indicates transposition and Jj is defined in (2). Un-
like typical zero-sum games in which there are no other con-
straints on the mixed-strategies, in our model, the jammer’s
mixed-strategy must satisfy the additional average power
constraint, JAve ≤ JMax. Hence, in this model, not all
mixed-strategies (and not even the pure strategies that are
greater than JAve) are feasible strategies [29, Sec. III.7]. If
we let y be the jammer’s mixed-strategy vector and Y be
the (NJ + 1)-simplex, we have the following relations:
y
T =
[
y0 . . . yj . . . yNJ
]
1×(NJ+1)
∈ Y (4)
NJ∑
j=0
yj = 1; yj ≥ 0, 0 ≤ j ≤ NJ
By using the jammer’s pure strategy vector we define the
constrained mixed strategy space YE as
YE = {y ∈ Y| y
T · J = JAve} (5)
which is a subset of the (NJ + 1)-simplex that satisfies the
average power constraint. By substituting the equality con-
straint in (5) with the less than or equal sign, we define a
new mixed strategy space which consists of all mixed strate-
gies that result in an average power less than or equal to
JAve. The new mixed-strategy space, YLE, is
YLE = {y ∈ Y| y
T · J ≤ JAve} (6)
It is obvious that
YE ⊂ YLE ⊂ Y
A typical mixed strategy space with equality constraint, as
defined in (5), is shown in Figure 3 where NJ = NT = 3.
In this case jammer’s mixed and pure strategy vectors are[
y0 y1 y2 y3
]
1×4
and
[
0 1
3
JMax
2
3
JMax JMax
]
1×4
.
Since by introducing the new mixed strategy spaces of (5)
and (6) we are eliminating some mixed strategies that could
have been otherwise selected, the existence of the Nash equi-
librium for this case must be first established. This is un-
like a typical zero-sum game with a finite number of pure
strategies in which the existence of the Nash Equilibrium is
4
Figure 3: A typical mixed-strategy space for average
power constrained jammer (JAve < JMax).
assured. In section 4.1, we provide an outline of the proof
of the existence of the Nash Equilibrium in our game where
the jammer’s mixed strategy space is limited to YE or YLE.
3.2 The Transmitter’s Strategy Set
The transmitter strategy set is a set of discrete transmission
rates corresponding to different assumed jamming power lev-
els, i.e, the transmitter chooses his rate, R, from the set
R =
{
Ri, 0 ≤ i ≤ NT
}
(7)
where
Ri =
1
2
log
(
1 +
PT
N + i
NT
JMax
)
(8)
and i
NT
JMax denotes the jammer’s power level assumed by
the transmitter. If the actual jammer’s power level is less
than or equal to the assumed value of i
NT
JMax, then trans-
mission at rate Ri is possible, otherwise reliable transmission
is not possible, the packet is lost, and the actual transmis-
sion rate drops to zero. Same as the case with the jammer,
we define the vector of mixed-strategies for the transmitter,
x, as
x
T =
[
x0 . . . xi . . . xNT
]
1×(NT+1)
∈ X (9)
where X is the (NT + 1)-simplex with no additional con-
straints.
3.3 The Payoff Function
The payoff to the transmitter is defined assuming transmis-
sions at the channel capacity. Defining the payoff based on
channel capacity (or other variations of channel capacity)
is a common practice in the games involving a transmitter-
receiver pair and an adversary [42, 12, 1].
Because transmissions occur in the presence of an adversary,
recovery of the transmitted information at the receiver is not
Figure 4: Uniformly distributed pure strategies;
NJ > NT (top) and NJ < NT (bottom)
always guaranteed. The information can only be recovered
when the actual jamming power, J , is less than or equal to
the jamming power level assumed by the transmitter, JT ,
i.e., if and only if J ≤ JT . If JT < J , the corresponding
transmission rate would exceed the channel capacity and
the information would be lost. Therefore, the transmitter’s
payoff function is given by
C(JT , J) =
{
R(JT ) =
1
2
log
(
1 + PT
N+JT
)
JT ≥ J
0 JT < J
(10)
Since the game in study is a zero-sum game, the payoff to
the jammer is the negative of the transmitter’s payoff. We
can formulate the payoffs in a payoff matrix where the trans-
mitter and the jammer would be the row and column players
respectively. The resulting payoff matrix, C, is
C =

R0 0 0 . . . 0
...
. . . 0 0
...
Ri . . . Ri 0
...
...
. . .
...
RNT RNT . . . RNT RNT

(NT+1)×(NT+1)
(11)
where Ri is defined in (8). The expected payoff (or the game
value) of the game is
C(x,y) = xT · C · y, y ∈ YE or YLE (12)
In defining (11) we have assumed NJ = NT . As discussed
below, without loss of generality, we can always assume that
NT = NJ .
Lemma 1. Let C be the payoff matrix in the two-player
zero-sum game defined by the utility function (10). The
payoff matrix resulted by removing the dominated strategies
is a square lower triangular matrix with size less than or
equal to min
[
NT , NJ
]
. Furthermore, if the power levels were
uniformly distributed over
[
0, JMax
]
, the size of the non-
dominated payoff matrix would be the minimum of NT and
5
NJ .
Proof. Assume the jammer’s power levels are arbitrary
distributed over some range,
[
0, JMax
]
, and NT < NJ . A
typical case where NT < NJ is depicted in Figure 4 (top).
In Figure 4, the transmitter’s pure strategies are mapped to
the jammer’s power levels for better visualization. Between
some of the transmitter’s pure strategies there might be a
pure strategy of the jammer but since NT < NJ , accord-
ing to the Pigeonhole principle, between at least two of the
transmitter’s pure strategies (not necessarily any two pure
strategy as sketched) there must be more than one jam-
ming power level (shown as dashed or solid lines ending in
squares). Any of these jamming power levels (or pure strate-
gies) could be used to terminate the information transmitted
by the rate corresponding to the power level immediately to
the left of them (shown as solid line ending in circles). From
these pure strategies, a rational jammer would choose the
one with the lowest power level (the solid line) and hence,
it would dominate the rest (dashed lines). therefore, the
number of non-dominated pure strategies for the jammer is
at most equal to the the number of the transmitter’s pure
strategies (first part of the lemma).
If the pure strategies were uniformly distributed over
[
0,
JMax
]
, as sketched, for every transmitter’s pure strategy
there would be exactly one non-dominated strategy for the
jammer and hence, there would be no intention for the jam-
mer to use more pure strategies than the transmitter. The
same discussion can be given for the number of pure strate-
gies a rational transmitter should use for the case NT > NJ
(see Figure 4( bottom)). Henceforward, without loss of gen-
erality, we assume NT = NJ .
As a consequence of Lemma 1, in our study, we need to con-
sider only square matrices which simplifies further studies
and assumptions. In the section that follows, we will study
the outcome of the game when jammer’s average power as-
sumes different values.
4. GAME CHARACTERIZATION
In this section, we study the basic properties of the game.
We will show that although we have put an additional con-
straint on the jammer’s mixed strategy space, the existence
of the Nash equilibrium is still guaranteed.
Furthermore, we will show that by randomizing his strategy,
the jammer can force the transmitter to operate at his lowest
rate, given that he uses an average jamming power, JAve,
that is more than a certain threshold, JTH < JMax. We
also provide an upper bound for JTH in this section.
4.1 Existence of the Nash Equilibrium
We begin this section by the following lemma that shows ex-
istence of the Nash equilibrium under the additional average
power constraint is guaranteed.
Lemma 2. For the two-player zero-sum game defined by
the utility function C (JT , J), given in (10) and the payoff
matrix C, given by (11) and the transmitter’s mixed strat-
egy, x ∈ X, and the jammer’s mixed strategy, y ∈ YE or YLE
Figure 5: Semi-Uniform Distribution
(defined in (5) and (6), respectively), at least one Nash equi-
librium exists.
Nash in his 1951 seminal paper, “Non Cooperative Games”
[26], proved that for any game with finite set of pure strate-
gies, there exists at least one (pure or mixed) equilibrium
such that no player can do better by unilaterally deviating
from his strategy. In the proof of the existence of the Nash
equilibrium, no additional constraints were assumed on the
mixed strategy spaces. But, in our game model, we are
assuming an additional constraint on the jammer’s mixed
strategy space; the jammer must maintain a fixed or maxi-
mum average jamming power (corresponding to (5) and (6),
respectively). These additional assumptions change the jam-
mer’s mixed strategy space from the n-simplex to a subset
of it. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium theorem cannot be
applied to our model directly and the existence of the Nash
equilibrium must be established.
Proof (Outline). The proof of the existence of Nash
equilibrium hinges on the Sperner’s lemma and Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem and a corollary of this theorem on sim-
plotopes 2. Sperner’s lemma applies to simplicially subdi-
vided n-simplexes. It can easily be shown that by using a
radial projection, the mixed strategy space in our model,
which is a result of additional constraint of maintaining an
average jamming power (or maintaining a maximum average
power), can be projected to an appropriate lower dimension
m-simplex where m < n. A similar argument can be used
to generalize the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem to any arbi-
trary convex and compact set. Since the additional average
power constraint does not effect the convexity or compact-
ness of the mixed strategy space, we can conclude that all
the conditions and requirements assumed by the Sperner’s
lemma and the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem are satisfied
[3] and the existence of the Nash equilibrium for our problem
is guaranteed.
4.2 Existence of Jamming Power Threshold
The following theorem proves the existence of a threshold
jammer power that plays an important role in our further
development.
Theorem 1. For the two-player zero-sum game defined
with the utility function C (JT , J), given in (10), and the
2 There are alternative proofs for the existence of the Nash
equilibrium, i.e., using Kakutani fixed point theorem [29].
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Figure 6: Typical optimal mixed-strategies for the transmitter (left) and the jammer (right) for JAve ≥ JTH
payoff matrix C, given in (11), and the transmitter’s mixed
strategy, x ∈ X, and the jammer’s mixed strategy y ∈ YLE,
given in (6) and for all PT , N, JMax > 0
∃JTH ; 0 < JTH < JMax
such that, if JAve ≥ JTH then, ∃y
∗ ∈ YLE for which we
have
x
∗
T
=
[
01×NT 1
]
1×(NT+1)
C(x∗,y∗) = RNT
(13)
where x∗,y∗ are transmitter’s and jammer’s optimal mixed-
strategies, respectively and C(x∗,y∗) represents the value of
the game.
Theorem 1 states that there exists a jamming threshold
(JTH ) such that if the jammer’s average power exceeds JTH
then the transmitter’s optimal mixed-strategy is to use the
lowest rate.
Proof. Assume the jammer is using a mixed strategy
with the pmf given in Figure 5 (semi-uniform)3 which is
not necessarily an optimal mixed strategy. The parameters
of this pmf are
y0 = 1−
2NT
NT + 1
·
JAve
JMax
y =
2
NT + 1
·
JAve
JMax
(14)
It can be easily verified that the semi-uniform pmf satisfies
the average power constraint
NT∑
j=0
J · Pr
[
J
]
=
NT∑
j=0
(
j
NT
JMax
)
· Pr
[
J =
(
j
NT
JMax
)]
= JAve
We assume the transmitter is using an arbitrary mixed strat-
egy in which rates RNT (the lowest rate corresponding to
JT = JMax) and Ri (an arbitrary rate corresponding to
3 We will refer to this class of pmf/pdf as the semi-uniform
JT =
i
NT
JMax, 0 ≤ i < NT ) have probabilities xNT and xi
respectively. Define C to be the expected payoff for the jam-
mer’s semi-uniform mixed strategy against the transmitter’s
arbitrary mixed-strategy:
C = C−i,NT +RNT xNT × 1 +Rixi × Pr
[
J ≤ JT = Ji
]
= C−i,NTRNT xNT +Rixi (y0 + iy)
(15)
where C−i,NT is the partial expected payoff resulting from
all pure strategies except for the i’th and NT ’th strategies.
In order to improve his payoff, the transmitter, deviates from
his current strategy to x′NT = xNT +δ and x
′
j = xj−δ where
δ > 0. Defining C′ to be the expected payoff for the new
strategy, we have
C
′ = C−i,NT +RNT (xNT + δ)
+Ri (xi − δ)× Pr
[
J ≤ JT = Ji
]
= C + δ
[
RNT −Ri (y0 + iy)
] (16)
Let ∆C be the difference in the expected payoff caused by
deviating to the new strategy
∆C = C′ − C
= δ
(
RNT − 2Ri
NT − i
NT + 1
·
JAve
JMax
)
(17)
where δ > 0 and 0 ≤ i < NT . We show that there exists
a jammer power threshold, denoted by JTH , such that if
JAve ≥ JTH , then for all δ > 0 and for all i ∈ [0, JMax), we
have
∆C > 0 (18)
Assuming (for now) that ∆C > 0 we can rewrite (17) as
JAve ≥
1
2
JMax
NT + 1
NT − i
·
(
1−
RNT
Ri
)
= Zi, 0 ≤ i < NT
(19)
where Zi’s, for i = 0, . . . , NT − 1, are a set of NT finite
values. Let us define JTH = maxZi, then for
JAve ≥ JTH (20)
and for all δ > 0 and i ∈ [0, NT ) the inequalities in (19) and
(18) are satisfied.
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We showed that for JAve ≥ JTH , the transmitter can im-
prove his expected payoff by dropping probability from any
arbitrary rate (except for the lowest rate) and adding this
probability to the lowest rate. We can continue this process
until all other probabilities are added to the lowest rate prob-
ability and no further improvement to the expected payoff
is possible. This shows that the low rate is indeed an opti-
mal strategy for the transmitter against the jammer’s semi
uniform mixed strategy.
By using the semi-uniform pmf and JAve ≥ JTH , the jam-
mer can force the transmitter to operate at the lowest rate
and given that the expected payoff is bounded between the
transmitter’s lowest and highest rates, we can conclude that
the semi-uniform distribution is indeed an optimal mixed
strategy for the jammer when (6) is the mixed strategy
space4.
It is interesting to note that the packetized transmission
model employed here and the transmitter’s lack of knowl-
edge of the actual jammer power level benefits the jammer.
In fact, the jammer uses a power level less than JMax but
forces the transmitter to transmit at a rate corresponding
to JMax. This is similar to the situation in fading channels
where although the ergodic capacity can be large, the outage
capacity is considerably lower.
It is shown in Appendix A that Zi in (19) is maximized for
i = 0. Therefore an upper bound for JTH is
JTH,U =
1
2
NT + 1
NT
(
1−
RNT
R0
)
JMax (21)
In section 5.1 we show that by using an optimal mixed strat-
egy, the jammer can achieve a lower threshold than (21).
5. GAME ANALYSIS
In this section we study the optimal mixed strategies for
the jammer and the transmitter. We provide analytic and
computer simulated results and a comparison between power
thresholds resulted from computer simulation and the upper
bound derived in section 4.
Based on relative values of JAve and JTH , we study two
cases, the powerful jammer where JAve ≥ JTH and the weak
Jammer whereJAve < JTH .
5.1 Powerful Jammer
As a result of the Theorem 1, there exists a jamming thresh-
old (JTH ), such that if the jammer’s average power exceeds
JTH , then the transmitter’s optimal mixed strategy (or more
accurately, the optimal pure strategy in this case) is to use
the lowest rate. We formulate this fact in the following the-
orem.
4The JTH given by (20) is not necessarily the lowest possible
threshold since we have limited jammer’s strategies to semi-
uniform distributions. However, it is an upper bound for the
lowest JTH .
Figure 7: Comparison between the average power
threshold and its upper bound
Theorem 2. There exists a threshold JTH such that if
JAve ≥ JTH , the expected payoff of the game is
C
(
JAve
)
= RNT =
1
2
log
(
1 +
PT
N + JMax
)
The value of JTH is given by
JTH =
(
1−
1
NT
α
−1
RNT
)
JMax (22)
where Ri is defined in (8) and
α
−1 =
NT−1∑
i=0
(Ri)
−1 (23)
In other words, if the average jamming power exceeds JTH
given in (22), by randomizing his strategy, the jammer forces
the transmitter to operate at his lowest rate as if the jammer
was using JMax all the time (Barrage noise jammer). If we
define the effective jamming power, JEff, to be the jamming
power a Barrage noise jammer needs to force the transmitter
to operate at the same rate (RNT in this case) then, for the
powerful jammer the effective jamming power becomes
JEff = JMax (24)
Typical optimal mixed strategies for the transmitter and
the jammer in a powerful jammer case are given in Figure 6.
Proof of Theorem 2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
Details of deriving relation (22) are given in Section 5.2.
Unfortunately, jammer’s optimal mixed strategy cannot be
formulated in a closed form relation and the optimal dis-
tribution has to be calculated numerically. As we showed
in section 4.2, the simple semi-uniform pmf, shown in Fig-
ure 5, could be used to derive an upper bound for the jam-
ming threshold and as an approximation to the jammers
optimal mixed strategy (see Figure 6 (right)). The price
paid by deviating from the optimal mixed strategy to the
simple semi-uniform distribution is that the jammer has to
use more average power to force the transmitter to operate
at the lowest rate. A comparison between the jammer’s av-
erage power threshold given in (22) and the upper derived
in (21) is given in Figure 7.
5.2 Weak Jammer
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Figure 8: Typical optimal mixed-strategies for the transmitter (left) and the jammer (right) for JAve < JTH
A weak jammer has an average jamming power less than the
threshold, JAve < JTH . Typical optimal mixed strategies
for the weak jammer case are given in Figure 8.
In this case the expected payoff, C
(
JAve
)
∈
(
RNT , R0
]
. Al-
though a useful closed form relation between the expected
payoff and the jammer’s average power where JAve ∈
[
0,
JTH
)
cannot be derived, for specific values of the aver-
age jamming power the relation reduces to a simple form.
For these specific values, the expected payoff of the game,
C
(
JAve
)
, corresponds to one of the transmitter’s rates Ri,
i = 0, . . . , NT − 1. We present this fact in the following
theorem without providing the full proof.
Theorem 3. Assuming JAve < JTH
1. The expected payoff of the game is
C
(
JAve
)
=Rm+1
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
PT
N + m+1
NT
JMax
)
(25)
where m is the solution of
JAve =
(
m+ 1− α−1Rm+1
) JMax
NT
(26)
2. The transmitter’s optimal mixed strategy is
x
∗
T
m =
[
x0 x1 . . . xm 0 . . . 0
]
1×(NT+1)
where
xi = Pr
[
JT =
(
i
NT
)
JMax
]
= αmR
−1
i , 0 ≤ i ≤ m
(27)
and
α
−1
m =
m∑
i=0
(Ri)
−1 (28)
The optimal mixed strategies for a typical zero-sum two-
player game could be calculated by linear programming. Our
game model differs from a typical zero-sum game however,
linear programming could still be used to calculate the op-
timal mixed strategies by making the proper modifications
[29] and even though we do not provide the full proof for
the transmitter’s optimal mixed-strategy, the consistency of
(27) can be verified by computer simulation. Numerical cal-
culations verify that results achieved by using (27) as the
transmitter’s optimal mixed strategies are accurate to the
order of 10−15.
In order to prove (26), we first introduce the following lemma
without a proof.
Lemma 3. The semi-uniform distribution and the jam-
mer’s optimal mixed strategy (see Figure 8 (left)) result in
the same expected payoff against the transmitter mixed strat-
egy given in (27), if they have the same support and average
jamming power.
The outline of the proof for (26) will be given next.
Proof (Outline). Assume JAve is such that the trans-
mitter is using (m+ 1) of his pure strategies, i.e.,
x
∗
T
m =
[
x0 x1 . . . xm 0 . . . 0
]
1×(NT+1)
where x∗
T
m is given in (27). Using Lemma 1, the jammer only
needs to use the strategies Jj where j = 0, . . . , (m+ 1) and
the expected payoff of the game would be at least Rm+1 (oth-
erwise the jammer had to use more strategies). Lemma 3
suggests that the following semi-uniform distribution which
has the same support and average power as the jammer’s
optimal mixed strategy could be used instead to compute
the expected payoff of the game.
y
T
SU =
[
y0 y1 . . . ym+1 0 . . . 0
]
1×(NT+1)
yj =
{
1− 2NT
(m+2)
· JAve
JMax
j = 0
2NT
(m+1)(m+2)
· JAve
JMax
j = 1, . . . ,m+ 1
(29)
If we let the expected payoff of the transmitter be exactly
Rm+1, then
x
∗
T
m CySU = Rm+1 (30)
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Substituting (27) and (29) in (30) and solving for JAve re-
sults in (26).
Finally, letting Rm = RNT or equivalently letting m =
(NT − 1) in (26) we obtain the desired relation in (22).
For a weak jammer, the effective jamming power, JEff is
JEff =
(
m+ 1
NT
)
JMax (31)
If we define the effectiveness factor E to be the ratio of
the effective jamming power to the actual average jamming
power, we have
E
−1 =
JAve
JEff
=
(
m+ 1− α−1m Rm+1
)
·
(
JMax
NT
)
(
m+1
NT
)
JMax
= 1−
1
m+ 1
α
−1
m Rm+1 < 1
(32)
Similar to the case of the powerful jammer, the weak jammer
can cause more damage to the communication link than a
Barrage noise jammer with an average power JAve.
6. CONTINUOUS CASE
In this section we study the case where the jammer and the
transmitter have infinite pure strategies. In this case, in-
stead of finite number of pure strategies, the transmitter and
the jammer have a continuum of pure strategies that could
be represented as points in intervals R ∈
[
R(JMax), R(0)
]
and J ∈
[
0, JMax
]
respectively.
By letting NT →∞ in (22), we can find the jamming power
threshold for the continuous case to be
JTH,Lim = lim
NT→∞
JTH
=JMax −
1
2
log
(
1 +
PT
N + JMax
)
×
∫ JMax
0
[
1
2
log
(
1 +
PT
N + J
)]
−1
· dJ
(33)
Similar to the discrete case, we can use a continuous semi-
uniform distribution to approximate the jammer’s optimal
mixed strategy and find an upper bound for JTH,Lim.
JTH,Lim,UB =
1
2
[
1−
R(JMax)
R(0)
]
JMax (34)
7. CONCLUSIONS
We formulated the interaction between rate-adaptive com-
municating nodes and a smart power-limited jammer in a
game-theoretic context. We show that packetization and
adaptivity advantage the jammer. While, previous station-
ary information-theoretic capacity results correspond to a
pure Nash-Equilibrium, packetized adaptive communication
leads to lower game values. We show the existence of a mixed
Nash Equilibrium and how to compute it. More importantly
and surprisingly, we show the existence of a threshold on the
average power of the jammer, above which the transmitter
is forced to use a rate that corresponds to the maximum
power of the jammer (and not the average power). We fi-
nally show how the optimal strategies can be computed and
also derive a very simple (semi-uniform) jamming strategies
that forces the transmitter to operate at the lowest rate (as
if the jammer was continuously using its maximum power
and not its average power).
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A. UPPER BOUND FOR JAMMING
POWER THRESHOLD
In Section 4.2 we showed that the
JAve ≥ Zi =
1
2
JMax
NT + 1
NT − i
(
1−
RNT
Ri
)
(35)
where
Ri =
1
2
log
1 + PT
N +
(
i
NT
)
JMax
 (36)
We stated that Zi given in (35) is strictly decreasing function
of i hence, maxi ZI = Z0 and an upper bound for the average
power threshold is
JTH,U =
1
2
JMax
NT + 1
NT
(
1−
RNT
R0
)
(37)
Proof. To prove (37) first, we rewrite Zi as
Zi =
1
2
JMax
NT + 1
NT
1
1− i
NT
(
1−
RNT
Ri
)
; 0 ≤ i < NT
=
(
1
2
JMax
NT + 1
NT
)
JMax
JMax − (
i
NT
JMax)
(
1−
RNT
Ri
)
(38)
define J and R(J) as
J =
(
i
NT
JMax
)
0 ≤ i < NT
R(J) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
PT
N + J
)
0 ≤ J < JMax
(39)
substituting (39) in (38) and we have
Z(J) =
(
1
2
JMax
NT + 1
NT
)
JMax
JMax − J
[
1−
R(JMax)
R(J)
]
= a×
JMax
JMax − J
[
1−
R(JMax)
R(J)
]
= a× F (J); where a > 0 and 0 ≤ J < JMax
(40)
If F (J) in (40) were a decreasing function of J then, Zi and
Z(J) would also be decreasing functions of i and J respec-
tively. Now let
F (J) = f(J)g(J) where
f(J) =
JMax
JMax − J
g(J) = 1−
R(JMax)
R(J)
(41)
For decreasing F (J) we have
∂
∂J
F = g
∂
∂J
f + f
∂
∂J
g < 0
f, g > 0 for 0 ≤ J < JMax ⇒
∂
∂J
f
f
< −
∂
∂J
g
g
(42)
but from (41) we have
−
∂
∂J
g
g
=
1
N + J
×
(
x
1 + x
)(
log(1 + xm)
log(1 + x)
)
×
(
1
log(1 + x)− log(1 + xm)
)
∂
∂J
f
f
=
P−1T xmx
x− xm
(43)
where
x =
PT
N + J
and xm =
PT
N + JMax
(44)
obviously
0 < xm < x
if we plug (43) and (44) in (42) and simplify inequality we
have
Z =
x−1m x
1 + x
x− xm
log(1 + x)− log(1 + xm)
log(1 + xm)
log(1 + x)
> 1 for 0 < xm < x
(45)
We need to show that (45) holds for all 0 < xm < x but
first, we notice that
lim
x→x
+
m
Z ∼
x−1m log(1 + xm)
x−1 log(1 + x)
→ 1+ ∀ 0 < xm < x (46)
since we have
∂
∂z
z
−1 log(1 + z) < 0 ∀ 0 < z (47)
where we used the following natural logarithm property
z
1 + z
< log(1 + z) ≤ z for all z > 0 (48)
For simplicity we rewrite inequality in (45) as
Z2 = [x(x− xm) log(1 + xm)]
− [xm(1 + x) log(1 + x) (log(1 + x)− log(1 + xm))]
> 0
(49)
As a result of (46) we have lim
x→x
+
m
Z2 → 0
+ for all 0 <
xm < x. Since (49) holds for x → x
+
m, if Z2 was strictly
increasing function of x for all x > xm, (49) and (45) would
also hold as a corollary.
To show that Z2 is strictly increasing, we first verify that
∂Z2
∂x
(
x = xm
)
= 0 (50)
given that (50) is true, an alternative way to proceed is to
show that ∂Z2
∂x
is itself strictly increasing function of x (to
show that the second partial derivate is strictly positive).
Define Z3
Z3 =
∂2Z2
∂x2
× (1 + x)
=2 log(1 + xm)− 2xm + 2x log(1 + xm)
− 2xm log(1 + x) + xm log(1 + xm)
(51)
It can be verified that for all x > xm and xm > 0 we have
lim
x→x
+
m
Z3 > 0. Taking the partial derivate of Z3 with
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respect to x we have
∂Z3
∂x
= 2
[
log(1 + xm)−
xm
1 + x
]
(52)
but from (48) we have
log(1 + xm) >
xm
1 + xm
>
xm
1 + x
for all x > xm
⇒ 2
[
log(1 + xm)−
xm
1 + x
]
> 0 ∀x > xm > 0
(53)
and hence we conclude that
∂Z3
∂x
> 0 for all x > xm > 0 (54)
and Z2 is indeed an increasing function of x for all 0 < xm <
x. Taking the reverse steps that resulted in (49) and (45)
we conclude that Zi in (35) is indeed a decreasing function
and hence JTH,U given in (37) is an upper bound for JTH
in (22).
B. OPTIMAL MIXED-STRATEGIES
Assume 0 ≥ JAve < JTH is such that jammer’s optimal
mixed strategy is to use (m+ 1) of his pure strategies. It is
easy to show that in such a case, the transmitter’s optimal
mixed strategy includes, at most, (m+1) of his pure strate-
gies. For now, we assume the transmitter is using (m) of his
pure strategies, i.e.;
x
T =
[
x0 x1 . . . xm 0 . . . 0
]
1×(1+NT )
y
T =
[
y0 y1 . . . ym ym+1 0 . . . 0
]
1×(1+NT )
where 0 ≤ m < NT
(55)
The expected payoff of the game for the mixed-strategy pair
(x,y) given in (55) is
C(x, y) = xTCy
=
[
x0 x1 . . . xm 0 . . . 0
]
×

R0 0 0 . . . 0
...
. . . 0 0
...
Ri . . . Ri 0
...
...
. . .
...
RNT RNT . . . RNT RNT


y0
y1
. . .
ym
ym+1
0
. . .
0

=
[
m∑
i=0
xiRi
m∑
i=1
xiRi . . .
m∑
i=j
xiRi . . .
m∑
i=m
xiRi 0 . . .
]

y0
y1
. . .
ym
ym+1
0
. . .
0

=y0
m∑
i=0
xiRi + y1
m∑
i=1
xiRi + . . .
+ yj
m∑
i=j
xiRi + · · ·+ ymxmRm
(56)
We can rewrite (56) in terms of Ri’s;
C(x, y) =x0R0(y0) + x1R1(y0 + y1) + . . .
+ xiRi
i∑
j=0
yj + . . . xmRm
m∑
j=0
yj
(57)
Assume the transmitter is using the mixed-strategy x̂, de-
fined below, which not necessary an optimal mixed-strategy.
x̂ = α−1m
[
R−10 R
−1
1 . . . R
−1
m 0 . . . 0
]
1×(NT+1)
(58)
where αm is defined as
α
−1
m =
m∑
i=0
R
−1
i 0 < m < NT (59)
The expected payoff of the game for the mixed-strategy pair
(x̂,y) is
C
(
x̂,y
)
=x̂TCy
=
[
(y0) + (y0 + y1) + . . .
+
(
i∑
j=0
yj
)
+ · · ·+
(
i∑
j=m
yj
)]
αm
=
[(
1−
m+1∑
j=1
yj
)
+
(
m+1∑
j=2
yj
)
+ . . .
+
(
1−
m+1∑
j=i+1
yj
)
+ · · ·+ (1− ym)
]
αm
(60)
By expanding the sums in (60) we can rewrite the expected
payoff of the game for (x̂,y) in a more compact form
C
(
x̂,y
)
= αm×
1− ( y1 +y2 + . . . +yi+1 . . . +ym+1)+
1− ( y2 + . . . +yi+1 . . . +ym+1)+
...
...
. . .
...
...
1− ( +yi+1 . . . +ym+1)+
...
...
. . .
...
1− ( . . . +ym+1)

=
[(
m+ 1
)
−
(
m+1∑
j=0
jyj
)]
αm
(61)
but from (5) and for all y ∈ YE we have
J
T
y = JAve =
m+1∑
j=0
(
j
NT
JMax
)
yj
=
(
m+1∑
j=0
jyj
)
JMax
NT
⇒
m+1∑
j=0
jyj = NT
JAve
JMax
(62)
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substituting (62) in (61) and the expected payoff of the game
for the the mixed-strategy pair (x̂,y) becomes
C
(
x̂,y
)
=
(
m+ 1−NT
JAve
JMax
)
αm (63)
Hence, by using x̂ (which is not necessary an optimal mixed
strategy) against jammer’s arbitrary mixed-strategy with
average power JAve, the transmitter can achieve the ex-
pected payoff given in (63). Therefore, the expected payoff
of the game at equilibrium must at least be equal to (61),
i.e.,
C
(
x
∗
,y
∗
)
≥ C
(
x̂,y
∗
)
=
(
m+ 1−NT
JAve
JMax
)
αm (64)
In the same way, it can be shown that if the transmitter and
the jammer were using the same number of pure strategies,
(m+1), the mixed-strategy given in (58) results in the same
expected payoff give that m is replaced by (m+ 1).
Now, assume JAve is such that the jammer is using (m+1) of
his pure strategies. Define the the following mixed-strategy
for the jammer which is not necessary an optimal mixed-
strategy.
ŷ
T =
[
y0 y1 . . . ym ym+1 0 . . . 0
]
1×(1+NT )
yj =

R−10 Rm+1 j = 0(
R−1j −R
−1
j−1
)
Rm+1 j = 1, . . . ,m+ 1
0 m+ 1 < j ≤ NT
(65)
it can be verified that ŷ is indeed a mixed-strategy vector;
m+1∑
j=0
yj = Rm+1R
−1
0 +Rm+1
m+1∑
j=1
(
R
−1
j −R
−1
j−1
)
= Rm+1
(
R
−1
0 +
m+1∑
j=1
R
−1
j −
m+1∑
j=1
R
−1
j−1
)
= Rm+1
(
R
−1
0 +R
−1
m+1 −R
−1
0
)
= 1
(66)
Furthermore, we have
m+1∑
j=0
jyj =
m+1∑
j=1
jyj = Rm+1
(
m+1∑
j=1
j
(
R
−1
j −R
−1
j−1
))
= Rm+1
(
m+1∑
j=1
jR
−1
j −
m+1∑
j=1
(
j − 1 + 1
)
R
−1
j−1
)
= Rm+1
(
m+1∑
j=1
jR
−1
j −
m+1∑
j=1
(j − 1)R−1j−1
−
m∑
j=0
R
−1
j
)
= Rm+1
((
m+ 1
)
R
−1
M=1 −
m∑
j=0
R
−1
j
)
=
(
m+ 1
)
− α−1m Rm+1
(67)
hence the average power of ŷ becomes;
J
T
ŷ = JAve,m =
(
m+ 1− α−1m Rm+1
)JMax
NT
(68)
Assuming the jammer is using ŷ against transmitter’s arbi-
trary mixed-strategy, the expected payoff of the game is
C
(
x, ŷ
)
= xTCŷ = Rm+1x
T×

R0 0 0 . . . 0
...
. . . 0 0
...
Ri . . . Ri 0
...
...
. . .
...
RNT RNT . . . RNT RNT


R−10
R−11 −R
−1
2
...
R−1j −R
−1
j−1
...
R−1m+1 −R
−1
m
0
...
0

= Rm+1x
T

1(m+2)×1
0
...
0
 = Rm+1
(69)
since x is a mixed-strategy and has at most (m+1) non-zero
elements (see (55)).
Therefore, by using ŷ given in (65) against transmitter’s
arbitrary mixed-strategy, the jammer guarantees not to lose
more than Rm+1 given that his average jamming power is
JAve,m given in (68). Since ŷ is not necessary an optimal
mixed-strategy for the jammer, the optimal mixed-strategy
would at most be less than Rm=1, i.e.,
C
(
x
∗
,y
∗
)
≤ C
(
x
∗
, ŷ
)
= Rm+1 (70)
It can be shown (by induction) that for specific values of av-
erage jamming power given by (68) and for m = 0, . . . , NT −
1, optimal mixed-strategy for the transmitter is to use (m+
1) of his pure strategies. From (64) and by letting m →
(m+ 1) we have
C
(
x
∗
,y
∗
)
≥
(
m+ 2−NT
JAve,m
JMax
)
αm+1
=
(
1 + α−1m Rm+1
)
αm+1
α
−1
m+1 = α
−1
m +R
−1
m+1 ⇒ =
(
1 + α−1m+1Rm+1 − 1
)
αm+1
= Rm+1
(71)
Therefore from (70) and (71) we have
Rm+1 = C
(
x̂,y
∗
)
≤ C
(
x
∗
,y
∗
)
≤ C
(
x
∗
, ŷ
)
= Rm+1
⇒ C
(
x
∗
,y
∗
)
= Rm+1 for JAve = JAve,m (72)
and hence x̂ and ŷ defined in (58) and (65) are indeed op-
timal mixed-strategies for the transmitter and the jammer
respectively5.
5Not necessary unique though.
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